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The authors argue it is time to move beyond thinking of competition in social service con-
tracting simply in terms of whether competitive tendering procedures are used. Although the
procurement process is important, other factors should be examined as well. In particular, they
look at how market consolidation and accountability are related to competitive procurement.
Findings indicate that demand side–driven consolidation (i.e., governments purposely choosing
to go with fewer and larger contracts in which lead agencies manage vendor networks) has
both competitive and noncompetitive aspects that are in need of further study and that the
competition–accountability link is more complex than generally assumed. Although, as expected,
there is evidence that competition, in and of itself, leads to some contractor turnover, it does
not appear that competitive vendors are held to higher standards than their noncompetitive
counterparts regarding performance (as measured by adherence to contract terms).
Keywords: competition; contracting; social services; accountability
Government privatizes, mostly in the form of contracting, for many reasons. Commonlycited rationales by policy makers and advocates include cost savings, efficiency, better
service quality, flexibility, innovativeness, and limiting government growth (Kettl, 1993;
Savas, 2000). What lies at the core of these assertions is, as Kettl (1993, p. 1) calls it, the
“competition prescription.” Greene (2002) affirms the notion by observing that, in general,
“the evidence suggests that better efficiency comes from competition rather than from the
privateness or publicness of organizations” (p. 49). Public choice theorists argue that both
public and private monopolistic production of goods and services inherently leads to inef-
ficiency (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971; Tullock, 1965). However, monopoly exists most notably
in government. Privatization supporters thus contend that the injection of market-like com-
petition into public service production, often through competitive procurement of goods
and services from the private sector, will improve efficiency because competition forces
potential bidders to be responsive to buyers’ preferences and bid close to true production
costs to win contracts (DeHoog, 1984).
In many service areas, especially at the state and local levels, the concept of competitive
markets appears to be more rhetoric than reality (Van Slyke, 2003). In human service
contracting,1 lack of competition is particularly evident; the literature suggests that lack or
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absence of competition in social service contracting is the norm rather than the exception
(DeHoog, 1984, 1990; Donahue, 1989; Kettl, 1993; Kramer & Grossman, 1987; Sclar, 2000;
Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Van Slyke, 2003). Despite the ample evidence of noncompetition
provided in the existing literature, we argue that the previous findings and implications are
severely limited, which raises two research questions. Given what we know from these
past findings, can we convincingly say that noncompetition is the norm in social service
contracting? More critically, is the competition–noncompetition dichotomy a realistic
analytical framework for understanding the practice of contracting?
Addressing the first question, we argue that the previous scope of analysis has been too
narrow. Most past examinations are heavily drawn from case studies and surveys in a few
program areas of interest. Much of the contracting information was gathered at one time
point or through subjective recollections or judgments made by survey respondents
and interviewees. Our study examines a considerably wider array of health and human
services—more than 6,000 contracts in 121 service areas such as mental health and sub-
stance abuse treatment and prevention, child protection and welfare, domestic violence and
homeless shelters, adult services, developmental disabilities, and economic self-sufficiency.2
We also examine such data over a 5-year period rather than a single year “snapshot.”
Although our data are still limited because they originate from a single state, the generaliz-
ability of our findings should be superior to that of past research, which has been dominated
by single-jurisdiction case studies involving a limited numbers of services. Furthermore,
Florida’s aggressive pursuit of outsourcing in the social services mirrors what many other
states such as New York, Arizona, Michigan, and Kansas have experienced in recent years
in terms of privatizing human service delivery.
Second, and more important, the implications of the previous findings are limited because
the concept of competition has not been comprehensively and thoroughly explored—often
the exclusive focus has been on whether the initial service purchasing process was com-
petitive or not. Such a dichotomized characterization of the concept is problematic for the
following reasons. Many contracts, in terms of how they are operated and managed, do not
fall straight into this bifurcated mode of contracting patterns, but rather they run across a
spectrum and contain both competitive and noncompetitive aspects. Likewise, the presumed
benefits associated with competitive contracting modes, such as better efficiency and
performance, often go unchallenged under this categorization. In this study, we substantially
expand the scope of investigation on competition by exploring the potential complexity and
multifaceted policy implications involving contracting practices. Particularly, we focus on
investigating contract consolidation and the relationship between competition and account-
ability to shed light on this matter.
Contract consolidation, or a drop in the number of vendors used or available to bid on
contracts, can occur for both supply- and demand-side reasons. It might be that the market
is not able to sustain a critical mass of potential vendors after initial procurement because
of vendor exit. But it is also possible that the government may purposively choose to limit
the number of contractors with which it interacts . Demand-based consolidation is a recent
phenomenon in which government bundles previously separate but interrelated service
contracts into a few lead agency contracts. Once government awards a master contract to a
lead agency, it is the lead agency’s responsibility to secure and manage all subcontractors
for integrated service delivery. As we elaborate on in later sections, this new contracting
Lamothe, Lamothe / Social Service Contracting 165
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
strategy does not quite fit into the existing conceptual bifurcation of competition versus
noncompetition. On one hand, demand-side consolidation can be seen to promote compe-
tition in that the selection of lead agencies usually follows competitive procedures, often as
a legal requirement. Rather than awarding and managing many, usually noncompetitively
procured, small contracts, public managers now concentrate their resources and staff in
securing and managing a few competitively bided lead agency contracts. Conversely, such
consolidation could be a step back from competition because it usually relies on lengthy
contractual commitments to a few large lead agencies, which raises the possibility of private
monopoly or oligopoly in the future. It is not clear whether the benefits of this scheme
outweigh the costs over the long term. Thus, we close with a call for future research and
data collection into this up-and-coming and important development in contracting.
Further support for the idea of a competition continuum rather than a simple dichotomy
is concerned with the competition–accountability link. A core question is, does competition
promote accountability? More specifically, are competitively procured contractors held
accountable more so than their noncompetitive counterparts? If we accept the competition–
noncompetition dichotomy based on market theory, the answers should be yes. But are
they? Our findings suggest otherwise. Limited contract accountability is observed across
the competitively and noncompetitively procured contracts. Regardless of the tendering
mode, public managers appear to remove the poorest performers from their vendor pool,
but they do not seem to hold competitive vendors to higher standards.
We begin our inquiry with descriptions of the data used. The theoretical and empirical
exploration of competition in social service contracting follows. The focus of the discus-
sions is on three aspects of competition: the prevalence of competitive procurement,
whether there is evidence of consolidation of vendors and/or contracts over time, and the
linkage between vendor performance and consequent contracting decisions. Implications of
the findings and conclusions are provided at the end.
Data
We utilize five fiscal years (FY 2000-2001 through FY 2004-2005) of contracting infor-
mation compiled by Florida’s largest health and human services agency (Department of
Children and Families [DCF]) to complete our analyses. DCF contracts with private entities
for the majority of the services it provides. As of January 2006, the department had 1,116
contracts with a total value of $3.69 billion (Florida Legislature Office of Program Policy
Analysis and Government Accountability, 2006b).
The analyses are based on two sources of information: the Florida Accounting and
Information Resource (FLAIR) and the Statewide Monitoring Reporting System (SMORES).
The FLAIR database contains information regarding all health and human services con-
tracts procured and managed by DCF. The types of data we obtain from this information
system include contract managing district, vendor identity, contract amounts and periods,
service types, procurement methods, and contract renewal status.
The SMORES database is the product of the DCF’s recent effort to collect statewide
contract compliance information by converting highly qualitative, district-based monitoring
reports into quantitative measures with a 3-point rating scale (i.e., major, moderate, and
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minor) of contract noncompliance.3 Although this reporting system was never fully developed
into an official database and was discontinued after 3 years of experiments, the final year
of the pilot project (i.e., FY 2003-2004) provides data on contract compliance and perfor-
mance that are comprehensive enough to be used for our analyses.4 A total of 205 on-site
monitoring reports are utilized to examine vendor performance, which then is traced forward
to the vendor’s contract status (i.e., continued or discontinued) in the following year. The
main focus of the oversight is on contract compliance including legal and program mandates,
funding requirements, and contract-specific terms and conditions.
The total number of contracts examined in this article is 6,061 in 121 service areas under
six different programs. Most contracts are negotiated and administered on an annual basis,
although some are multiyear contracts. The most common contracting cycle begins with the
first day of the fiscal year (July 1) and ends on the last day (June 30). However, contracts
may have different decision cycles if their expiration dates are extended (up to 6 months)
or their starting dates are delayed (e.g., October instead of July) for some reason.5 All health
and human services contracts valued at less than $25,000 are excluded from the data set
because Florida law does not require these small contracts to be competitively bid. Many
of these contracts are procured through standardized, statewide procedures for small
purchases (Florida DCF, 2003a, 2005).6 All non–human services contracts, such as building
maintenance and computer system development, are also excluded from the analyses. The
majority of the vendors (about 77%, on average, for the entire study period) were nonprofit
organizations, with government agencies, for-profit business entities, and individuals com-
posing the remainder.7 Subsequently, the discussions in the following sections mainly per-
tain to various contractual relationships and interactions between nonprofits as service
providers and governments as buyers. Table 1 provides the detailed statistics about the
programs under investigation with regard to the number of contracts and vendors and
the contract amounts that are included in the analyses.
As can be seen, two program areas, family safety and mental health and substance abuse,
dominated DCF contracting over the time frame of the study. Combined, these services
accounted for 76.7% of all contracts and 95.6% of all contract dollars spent. Hence, our
discussions and analyses will heavily focus on these program areas. In the following sections,
we investigate the three aspects of competition (i.e., procurement, consolidation, and account-
ability) by first discussing the existing literature and then examining the Florida human
service contracts data.
Just How Prevalent is Competitive Procurement 
in Social Service Contracting?
The extant literature commonly characterizes social service contracting as noncompeti-
tive (DeHoog, 1984, 1990; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Kettl, 1993; Kramer & Grossman, 1987;
Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Van Slyke, 2003). DeHoog (1984) finds from her case study of fed-
erally funded social and job training services that outsourcing human services involves
much more complex processes and consequences than public choice theorists generally
anticipate. She argues that competition and the resulting efficiency gains are seldom
achieved in social service contracting because both governments as buyers and nonprofits
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as the main service deliverers have different incentive structures and engage in different
decision-making processes from those involved in typical market transactions for hard
goods and services. For instance, in social service contracting, cost savings are often less a
Table 1
Summary Description of Florida Human Service Contracting 
for FY 2000-2001 to FY 2004-2005
Program Area 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 Change (%)a
Family safety
Number of contracts 520 507 541 401 213 –59.0
Number of vendors 294 288 299 232 146 –50.3
Contract amounts ($) 390.8 370.1 428.9 641.7 687.4 +75.9
Mental health and substance abuse
Number of contracts 494 534 495 490 453 –8.3
Number of vendors 297 308 290 293 285 –4.0
Contract amounts ($) 559.8 571.6 575.9 568.3 558.9 –0.2
Developmental services
Number of contracts 250 224 219 109 90 –64.0
Number of vendors 156 138 130 77 73 –53.2
Contract amounts ($) 26.7 19.7 20.0 14.3 11.9 –55.4
Economic self-sufficiency
Number of contracts 38 87 101 80 81 +113.2
Number of vendors 32 64 67 52 52 +62.5
Contract amounts ($) 44.6 17.2 19.8 13.9 13.0 –70.9
Adult services
Number of contracts 24 22 23 17 15 –37.5
Number of vendors 23 22 23 17 15 –34.8
Contract amounts ($) 4.3 4.0 4.5 2.2 1.9 –55.8
Health services
Number of contracts 6 9 6 5 7 +16.7
Number of vendors 5 9 6 5 7 +40.0
Contract amounts ($) 6.0 7.7 6.5 4.4 6.7 +11.7
Total
Number of contracts 1,332 1,383 1,385 1,102 859 –35.5
Number of vendors 807 829 814 676 578 –28.4
Contract amounts ($) 1,032.2 990.3 1,055.6 1,244.8 1,279.8 +24.0
Note: Contract amounts are reported in millions of dollars. The numbers of contracts, vendors, and dollar
amounts presented in this table are less than the Department of Children and Families (DCF) overall contract
size because a number of contracts were excluded when they fell into the following categories: (a) all nonhu-
man services such as information technology, building maintenance, or personnel management; (b) all contracts
whose contract amounts are $25,000 or less for which a competitive procurement method is not required by
policy or expected; (c) subsidized child care contracts (In FY 2000-2001, child care contracts constituted the
biggest dollar amount contracts in the family safety program. The DCF went through divestiture in the follow-
ing year by handing most of its large-scale child care contracts over to the Agency of Workforce Innovation as
part of implementing the federal welfare reform policies. The DCF still has some child care training contracts,
but they are much smaller in scale than before). Contract amounts were first annualized to obtain yearly expen-
ditures (the presence of many multiyear contracts can greatly inflate the total contract amounts if not adjusted)
and are presented in 2004 constant dollars.
a. Change = ((FY 2004-2005 – FY 2000-2001) ÷ FY 2000-2001) × 100.
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priority than the quality and equity of service delivery and the achievement of client well-
being (DeHoog, 1984). The contracting process can be more political than rational in that
the executives, board members, and related advocacy groups of nonprofits become aggres-
sive political forces that lobby to secure government funds for their causes and programs
(DeHoog, 1984, 1990; Kettl, 1993; Smith & Lipsky, 1993).
Van Slyke (2003) interviews New York state and county public managers in social ser-
vice programs and finds inconsistent use of competitive bidding among the agencies.
Barriers to competition exist both inside and outside of the government and include such
concerns as the public agencies’ lack of staff and resources to develop competition, antici-
pated market unavailability and the resultant unwillingness to utilize competitive bidding,
and political pressure from lawmakers and elected officials who are lobbied by nonprofit
executives and advocacy groups (Van Slyke, 2003). Meanwhile, Smith and Lipsky (1993,
p. 173) point out the common presence of “mutual back-scratching” between nonprofits
and government service agencies for advocating and developing programs. Social service
agencies frequently perceive their nonprofit counterparts as goal-sharing partners who
influence legislators and elected officials to make favorable decisions for their programs
(Kettl, 1993). Moreover, nonprofit executives are often invited into public agencies’ rule- or
policy-making processes to provide input (Smith & Lipsky, 1993).
A notable exception to this dominant theme of noncompetition in social service contract-
ing is found in Savas (2002). He examines New York City’s procurement process in three
human service areas (homeless shelter, home care, and employment training) and observes
significant competitiveness. The weakness of his findings is that although the government’s
intention to ensure competitive procedures (e.g., issuing bidding announcements, distribut-
ing requests for proposals [RFPs], etc.) is demonstrated, the actual number of proposals sub-
mitted by bidders is less than impressive (i.e., on average less than three per contract award).
In addition, nearly all incumbent contract providers won the awards whenever they applied,
and some of these vendors did not face any competitors in their bidding processes. We would
argue that Savas, in effect, measures the use of best practices by government more so than
actual competition. Hence, the general conclusion we take from the existing literature is that
competition is often absent or at best substantially weak in social service privatization.
There are various explanations as to why noncompetition or a lack of competition is so
prevalent in social service contracting. Both the history and the nature of human services
seem to play roles. Historically, one of the main rationales for fostering nonprofit service
delivery through government contracts and grants was promoting democracy rather than
efficiency. The argument goes that such delivery arrangements enfranchise community-
based, neighborhood organizations and increase active citizen involvement (Kettl, 1993).
Government’s efforts to recruit service providers from nonprofit markets were often char-
acterized as cooperative, invitational, and even nurturing rather than competitive (DeHoog,
1984; Kramer & Grossman, 1987). As nonprofits established solid partnerships with gov-
ernment and government contracts became a primary funding source for many nonprofits
(Salamon, 1987), these historical factors may have become less meaningful. However, the
rapid growth in human service contracting during the past several decades has transformed
many nonprofit enterprises into formidable political forces in social policy making (Kettl,
1993; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Van Slyke, 2003). DeHoog (1984, p. 27) characterizes this
phenomenon as the “politics of cooptation” in which politically active contractors become
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close allies with government decision makers. Similarly, Van Slyke (2003) characterizes
this as networking among nonprofits, public agencies, and elected officials.
The characteristics of health and human services are another factor that may contribute
to the lack of competition. Many such services are by their nature difficult to measure in
terms of specifying goals and evaluating provider performance (DeHoog, 1984; Donahue,
1989; Ferris & Graddy, 1986). Although ensuring fair and effective competition requires
substantial investment of staff time and resources to develop clearly specified RFPs (to
include program goals, performance measures, program descriptions, staff qualifications,
etc.) and to evaluate the bidders’ proposals and past performance to identify the best one to
meet the criteria (Kramer & Grossman, 1987), such tasks can constitute a daunting challenge,
even for public agencies with the requisite resources. Ironically, public managers often face
severe resource constraints in fulfilling these tasks because of downsizing that typically
accompanies privatization (Van Slyke, 2003). A common solution is to rely less on com-
petitive bidding and more on relational contracting in which the agency and vendor engage
in a more informal, cooperative, flexible, and interdependent relationship (Sclar, 2000,
pp. 121-128; also see the related discussions in DeHoog, 1984). From the review of the exist-
ing literature, the indication of noncompetitive procurement appears to be ubiquitous, and
we expect to witness similar patterns in Florida social service contracting. Our focus is to see
whether and to what extent the largest Florida human service agency (DCF) utilizes compet-
itive bidding processes to choose its vendors.
Procurement of Florida Human Services
The examination of the DCF’s service procurement data indicates that noncompetition
is indeed the dominant pattern observed in Florida human service purchasing. It is inter-
esting that, however, the trend over the study period signals a rising level of competitive
procurement in Florida. Table 2a demonstrates that the DCF contracts out most of its
human services through noncompetitive procurement methods. In all five fiscal years
reviewed, more than 80% of the contracts the agency executed and managed were not ini-
tially put out to bid. The most commonly used noncompetitive procurement method was
the exempted category. These are services that are exempted by Florida Statutes from the
requirements of competitive procurement. The FLAIR contracting information system rec-
ognizes 15 different types of statutorily exempted services (see the notes to Table 2a for
details). The most frequently utilized exemptions are concerned with mental health services
involving examinations, diagnosis, and treatment; services provided by nonprofits for the
mentally or physically disabled; prevention services provided by nonprofits related to men-
tal health including drug abuse and child abuse prevention; and contracts with other gov-
ernment agencies. For example, these four categories compose approximately 81% of all
the exempted-by-law contracts in FY 2004-2005. Scholarly research as to why noncom-
petitive procurement has widely been used in Florida and still is one of the dominant pur-
chasing modes for human services is nearly nonexistent. However, we consider several
potential factors that might have contributed to the phenomenon.
First, under an earlier contracting system, Florida mainly adopted invitations to bid (ITB)
as the standard method for competitively procuring goods and services.8 But many human
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services, especially behavioral health care, were exempted from this practice because the
quality of services and specific needs of clients were considered more important than simply
finding the lowest cost vendor. Also, precisely defining the requested services, as required
in an ITB, is difficult for these types of services. Second, during the 1960s and 1970s, needs
and demands for community-based mental health centers operated through government con-
tracting greatly increased as many states pursued deinstitutionalization strategies (i.e., shutting
down state mental hospitals) in an effort to shift costs to the federal government through
programs such as Medicaid (Torrey, 1997). Given the scarcity of available and qualified
providers to deliver contracted client services at the time, states essentially nurtured new
vendors, especially nonprofit entities, by building needed facilities, soliciting potential con-
tractors, and technically assisting and training them to deliver contracts. Third, the private
markets for social services have grown substantially since then, but it is hard to overcome
institutional inertia, interdependency, and entrenched interests—the vendors have become
more political and quite adept at lobbying the legislature to protect their interests.9
Over the entire study period, competitive procurement accounts for only a small fraction
of the DCF contracting (less than 20%). However, the proportion of the services that are
competitively contracted out appears to be increasing over time (see Table 2a). For example,
Table 2a
Procurement Methods Used in Social Service Contracting:
Proportion of Contracts
2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 Overall 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) %
Noncompetitive: Exempteda 87.2 81.8 82.2 79.6 78.7 82.3
Noncompetitive: Otherb 3.3 2.4 1.6 1.8 4.1 2.5
Competitive: Successfulc 8.7 15.1 15.6 17.8 16.6 14.5
Competitive: Unsuccessfuld 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7
ne 1,332 1,381 1,375 1,083 831 6,002
a. The “noncompetitive exempted” category includes services that were contracted out noncompetitively under
the regulated exemptions referred to in chapter 287.057(5)(f), Florida Statute. These include contracts for indi-
vidual artists’ work; academic program reviews; health services involving examination, diagnosis, treatment,
prevention, medical consultation, or administration; legal services including attorney, paralegal, and expert wit-
nesses; Medicaid services; services to persons with mental or physical disabilities by nonprofit corporation
exempted under sec. 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code; auditing services; family placement and
adoption placement services licensed by the Department of Children and Families; prevention services related
to mental health including drug abuse and child abuse prevention, and shelters for runaways, operated by non-
profit corporations; training and education services provided to injured employees; and lectures by individuals.
b. The “noncompetitive other” category includes the services purchased through single sources, emergency pur-
chases, the Department of Management Services Contractual Services State Contract System, the Another
Government Agency Contract system, and small purchase procedures.
c. The “competitive successful” category is the services that were procured through such competitive solicita-
tion processes as invitation to bid, request for proposal, or invitation to negotiate. This category also includes
the services that were initially procured through the aforementioned methods and renewed.
d. The “competitive unsuccessful” category is concerned with the services that were competitively solicited but
resulted in no response or only one response from potential bidders.
e. This table contains fewer contracts than those presented in Table 1 because of missing procurement information.
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between FY 2000-2001 and FY 2004-2005, noncompetitive procurement (i.e., exempted
and other) decreased by 7.7 percentage points, whereas successfully competitively procured
contracts increased by 7.9 percentage points.10
Dissecting the data by contract amounts instead of the number of contracts more
convincingly suggests that competitive procurement is on the rise in Florida social service
contracting. Table 2b shows substantial increases in the proportion of contract spending
awarded through competitive processes over time. Competitively awarded contracts accounted
for just 15.2% of spending in 2000-2001. But this proportion increased every year and
reached nearly 40.0% by 2004-2005. Following from this, we see that “competitive: success-
ful” contracts were consistently larger, on average, than their “noncompetitive: exempted”
counterparts (examining the other categories—“noncompetitive: other” and “competitive:
unsuccessful”—in this context is less useful as each represented few contracts each year
[an average of 30 and 8, respectively] and therefore were very vulnerable to changes in
individual contracts).
What facilitated the enhancement of competitive bidding? The biggest reason is a legal
mandate (see Florida Statues 287.057(1)(a)) for competitively soliciting contracts greater
than $25,000 except for those that are specifically exempted from the requirements. Among
many newly outsourced and existing contracts, especially in the family safety program area,
as discussed in detail in the following section, there has been a trend toward increasing size
and scope, which subjects them to mandatory competitive procurement. We also partially
credit the recent DCF reorganization for the change. The DCF undertook a major overhaul
of its contracting system, starting in 1998, in efforts to specialize and professionalize its
contract management functions. A full-time contracting unit was created in each district to
effectively administer and manage district contracts. At DCF headquarters, the Office of
Contracted Client Services was established to develop statewide policies on procurement,
contract administration and operations, and contract monitoring. Although the aforemen-
tioned changes generally enhanced the agency’s contract management capacity to handle
more rigorous purchasing processes, specific features such as establishing contract proposal
evaluation and negotiation teams and creating standardized contract templates enabled public
managers to process large batches of competitively bided contracts in an efficient manner.
Compared to contract management systems in many other states, we can say that Florida,
especially the DCF, appears to have a highly centralized contract management structure.
Also, it is worth pointing out that a market proponent—Jeb Bush—held the Florida gover-
norship over the time frame of the study. Although many of the privatization efforts preceded
Bush’s arrival, he and his appointees are certainly enthusiasts who put much effort into
continuing and accelerating market-oriented approaches and practices.
Related to all this, DCF changed the way it handles its family safety contracts, which
dramatically altered the nature and scope of these contracts. For example, between FY
2000-2001 and FY 2004-2005, the proportion of family safety contracts that were compet-
itively tendered increased from 7.5% to 21.9%, and the proportion of contracting dollars in
this program spent on competitively procured contracts increased from 21.3% to nearly
63.0%. By contrast, the mental health and substance abuse program (remember, these two
programs account for about 96% of all the spending in our data) saw more moderate
increases. The percentage of competitively awarded contracts moved from 9.3% up to
12.2%, and spending rose from 9.7% to 12.2%. These changes are discussed below.
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Competition or Consolidation in Social Service Markets?
The second aspect of competition we explore, consolidation, has received little empirical
attention, although its theoretical implications have been abundantly discussed in the social
service contracting literature. It should be noted that we limit our investigation of this con-
cept to the consolidation of the contracts and vendors generally, but not individual service
providers per se, because of the lack of data availability. That is, we are not able to specifi-
cally test if vendors gather increasing market shares over time but rather simply if there are
diminishing numbers of contracts and/or vendors across the time frame of the study.
Consolidation occurs when governments come to rely on a few large-scale providers for
integrated programs rather than negotiating individual service contracts with small
community-based organizations. Consolidating or bundling individual services into larger
and fewer contracts may weaken competition by eventually reducing the number of avail-
able vendors in the social service markets. According to this logic, small, local providers
who do not have financial and programmatic capacities and flexibilities are not as compet-
itive as large, multiprogram providers in ensuring contract awards and thus are more likely
to lose program funding from government as it promotes consolidation. As a consequence,
small vendors will eventually be pushed out of the market. If this occurs, governments may
become more dependent on large providers for service delivery. Such limited markets
might hinder governments’ abilities to leverage what they can buy and could promote oppor-
tunistic behavior by vendors. This, in turn, could result in increased transaction costs for
governments because monitoring and accountability are harder to manage when competi-
tion is limited (DeHoog, 1984; Williamson, 1985).
Despite this possibility, however, incentives to consolidate seem to exist both within gov-
ernments and among nonprofit organizations. Some nonprofits aggressively seek to expand
their programs to become “miniconglomerates” (Kramer & Grossman, 1987, p. 44) in hopes
of maximizing government funding opportunities. Kramer and Grossman (1987) note that
such trends frequently reflect “changing governmental funding priorities, the (nonprofit)
agency’s funding strategy, and its entrepreneurial skills” (p. 44). Simply put, organizations
that can adapt to changing environments by offering services in a variety of areas are less
likely to suffer fiscal distress; hence, expansion can be seen as a way of promoting stability.
From the government’s point of view, there are several reasons why public managers
might prefer large providers to small grassroots organizations. First of all, they may have
incentives to do so to reduce transaction costs associated with procuring, negotiating, writ-
ing, executing, and monitoring individual contracts because consolidation means managing
fewer contractors. Another force that may promote consolidation in social service con-
tracting is an increasing emphasis on nonprofit accountability (Kearns, 1994; Keating &
Frumkin, 2003; Stone, Bigelow, & Crittenden, 1999). With rising concerns about nonprofit
performance and contract compliance in carrying out public services, government tends to
favor bigger and more business-like providers with better financial and administrative
capacities. Small, grassroots, community-based organizations often lack sufficient internal
controls, client databases, reporting systems, and professional staff (Kramer, 1994; Smith &
Lipsky, 1993). Last, government may seek to improve efficiencies by contracting with
vendors with large production capacities and take advantages of economies of scale (Ferris &
Graddy, 1986).
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A question is then how the DCF weighs the relative magnitudes of these costs and benefits
in its decision making. The obvious and immediate benefits associated with consolidating
contracts could likely overwhelm concerns of increases in transaction costs in the future as
the possibility of monopolistic contracting environments may seem remote and inconse-
quential to government officials who tend to have limited time horizons.
By analyzing longitudinal information on Florida social services contracts, we scrutinize
whether consolidation (i.e., reductions in the number of contracts and/or vendors while
funding levels remain stable or rise) has occurred. We then move to a closer examination
of a program area that appears to show evidence of consolidation and discuss its policy
implications.
Consolidation in Florida Social Service Contracting
The examination of the Florida social service contracting patterns provides mixed evidence
on consolidation. As Table 1 exhibits, mental health and substance abuse services, one of
the two biggest program areas, display minor fluctuations in terms of the number of contracts
and vendors over the time frame of the study (i.e., the number of contracts and vendors drop
by 8.3% and 4.0%, respectively). The total contract dollars for these services reflects this
stability because it shows essentially no change over time (i.e., a 0.2% drop between FY
2000-2001 and FY 2004-2005). Other programs such as adult and developmental services
show diminishing numbers of contracts and vendors. An administrator explained to us that,
during this period, DCF transferred the developmental services program to the Agency for
Persons with Disabilities, which tracks its contractual services through a different database.
So although DCF still provides administrative functions, including contract administration,
to this program, much of the budget moved off the FLAIR database used in our analysis.
Similar changes occurred regarding adult services. A slightly different pattern is observed
in economic self-sufficiency services in that there was a substantial increase in the number
of contracts and vendors between the FY 2000-2001 and FY 2001-2002, mainly because of
newly added homeless services.11 None of these changes, however, meet our definition of
consolidation.
On the other hand, a glance at the contracting patterns in the family safety program
signals the potential occurrence of consolidation (see Table 1). The number of family safety
contracts and vendors dropped by fairly sizable amounts (59.0% and 50.3%, respectively),
whereas expenditures increased notably (75.9%), indicating that changes were not related
to less contracting effort or funding shifts by the state. If these statistics suggest potential
evidence of consolidation, the next question is, why has it occurred in the family safety
program in particular, and what has really happened?
A closer look at the family safety program data suggests that the majority of the changes
reflect what has taken place in recent years in child welfare services. The transformation
involves both integrating conventional out-of-home care service contracts into single, large,
community-based care (CBC) contracts and further privatization of the remaining public
child welfare services and related management functions to lead agencies.12 Our study
period (FYs 2001 to 2005) captures almost the entire process of this transformation because
the DCF executed its first CBC service contracts in FY 2000-2001 and completed its
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statewide transition to the CBC contract structure in FY 2005-2006 (Florida Legislature,
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 2006b).13 As of January
2006, the DCF had 22 CBC service contracts worth $625.4 million with 20 lead agencies
to provide child protective services in all of the state’s 67 counties (Florida Legislature,
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 2006a). Table 3 illus-
trates how the sizable reductions in the contracts and vendors and simultaneous increases
in the contract funding levels over time correspond with the emergence of the CBC contracts
in the family safety program.
The core idea of the CBC or more generally the “lead agency” model (McCullough &
Schmitt, 2000) is to establish integrated systems of care to provide comprehensive and
coordinated child protective services (e.g., family preservation, emergency shelter, foster
care, and adoption services) to all children and families residing in a community (Falconer,
Cash, & Ryan, 2001). A lead agency acts as a managed care entity that develops and manages
a network of service providers (McCullough & Schmitt, 2000) and assumes the majority of
program planning, coordination, and management functions that public agencies previously
carried out. The underlying rationales and expectations are to curb rapidly rising costs and
workload and to improve efficiency and the quality of care in troubled child welfare systems
(Field, 1996) by borrowing the concept of “managed care principles and practices from
health and behavioral health care fields” (Courtney, 2000, p. 88).
The CBC transformation in Florida reflects a wider child welfare reform initiative based
on this managed care approach. Although some critics view this new managed child
welfare innovation as another “vehicle for the privatization of public child welfare services”
(Embry, Buddenhagen, & Bolles, 2000, p. 94), Florida eagerly adopted the initiative and
began to restructure its child welfare service delivery system by statutorily mandating the
DCF to enter into contracts with lead agencies in 1998 (Florida Legislature, Office of
Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 2004). Florida is not alone in its
desire to transform its child protective services through a managed care approach.
McCullough and Schmitt (2000) report that 29 states had undertaken such initiatives as of
Table 3
Consolidation in the Family Safety Program
2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005
Number of contracts
Non-CBC 516 501 534 383 189
CBC 4 6 7 18 24
Total family safety 520 507 541 401 213
Number of vendors
Non-CBC 290 283 292 214 124
CBC 4 5 7 18 22
Total family safety 294 288 299 232 146
Contract amounts
Non-CBC ($) 347.9 271.9 309.0 257.9 194.6
CBC ($) 42.8 98.1 119.9 383.8 492.9
Total family safety ($) 390.8 370.1 428.9 641.7 687.4
Note: CBC = community-based care.
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1999, with more than half adopting a lead agency model similar to Florida’s in which there
is some risk sharing between the contracting entity and the vendors. In an update based on
2001 data, McCullough and Schmitt (2003, pp. 64-70) found that four additional states
had managed care initiatives, indicating that the movement continues to diffuse through
the states. Thus, the Florida experience speaks to a larger movement that affects much of
the country.
Risk sharing or risk transferring is a particularly attractive aspect of the CBC model.
Under this approach, contract amounts are usually capitated, and lead agencies are obligated
to provide wraparound services (e.g., foster care, case management, placement, adoption,
etc.) to all eligible children in their jurisdictions, which typically cover one or more counties.
Lead agencies, therefore, have clear incentives to be efficient in allocating resources and
managing cases. Another merit of the CBC model is its use of clear outcome measures as
a way to ensure contract accountability. Although most Florida client service contracts are
considered performance contracts, typical measures included in contracts are often beyond
what individual providers can achieve within annual contracting cycles, which makes it
almost impossible to hold vendors accountable for their outcomes. In addition, gathering
performance data is often not part of provider reporting requirements. By contrast, CBC
contracts are built around clearly written and measurable outcomes that can be traced back
to lead agencies’ performance. Data gathering on performance measures is systematic
rather than haphazard.
Although Florida has chosen consolidation rather than market competition as a way to
achieve effective service delivery, the question remains as to whether this demand-side initia-
tive will eventually lead to monopolistic or oligopolistic markets and, if it does, whether the
benefits from a consolidated market will still prevail. Any attempts to answer this question
here are inappropriate because the subject is beyond the scope and analysis of our study.
However, there are some important clues that are currently observable in the search for
answers. First of all, the DCF has increasingly utilized multiyear commitments for the
consolidated CBC contracts, which could significantly facilitate monopolized markets.
Although the agency shows an increasing preference for longer-term contracts across all
program areas (93% of all contracts executed in FY 2000-2001 were annually based,
whereas only 81% of the total contracts were so in FY 2004-2005), the trend is particularly
marked regarding the large and expensive CBC contracts.14 The average contract length and
annualized amounts of the CBC contracts for FY 2004-2005 are 3.4 years and $20.5 million,
respectively, compared to 1.3 years and $953,600 for all non-CBC contracts. Long-term
contracts could be considered anticompetitive in that they limit the effectiveness of account-
ability mechanisms over the term of the contract (contract termination requires greater
malfeasance than nonrenewal) and likely diminishes the pool of competitors by denying
them access to government funding for protracted periods.15
On the other hand, other forces exist to mitigate the potential for the seeking of monopoly
rents. Although the magnitudes, longevities, and complexities of consolidated contracts
clearly provide the incumbent CBC lead agencies with advantageous negotiation power,
they have less control and leverage than one might expect in their contractual relationships
with the government. One of the reasons for this is that lead agencies are often responsible
only for managing and coordinating subcontractors who deliver the actual services. The
lead agencies’ dependence on the networks of subcontractors is evidenced by the fact that
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as of December 2005, there were 20 lead agencies throughout Florida managing 500
subcontracts, including 64 subcontracts with case management organizations (Florida
Legislature, Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 2006a).
Any move by government to change management in the case of poor lead agency perfor-
mance could disrupt service continuity but is certainly “doable” without causing a sudden
collapse of existing service delivery structures because, by and large, the managers are not
participating in direct service delivery (and if they are, it is possible that they could lose the
management contract while retaining delivery duties). In fact, two incumbent lead agencies
lost their contracts in 2004 mostly because of financial problems (Florida Legislature,
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 2006a), but the transi-
tions to new lead agencies were done without leaving their respective districts in chaos.
Therefore, it may be that CBCs can be seen as striking a balance between the potential
dangers of consolidation and the advantages of fairly stable community-based networks.
This would be in line with the view of some scholars that public managers often act more as
pragmatists than as ideologues when designing their service delivery systems (see Hill &
Hupe, 2002, 109; Warner & Hefetz, 2004).
Are Social Service Providers Held Accountable 
Through Competition?
The final aspect of competition we examine is concerned with contract monitoring and
whether contractors are held accountable for their performance. In spot markets, true market
accountability occurs—good performers are rewarded through the sales of their products,
and poor performers exit because they are unable to earn profits. No organized oversight is
required. This is not the case with contracting for services. The contracting government
must actively monitor vendors to ensure performance is acceptable. As DeHoog (1984, p. 21)
states, “An effective government watchdog role” is one of the critical conditions for
successful contracting under market-like competition. This leads us to believe that there are
two forms of accountability that must be examined.
The first, which we term the internal managerial control component, relates to efforts by
the government to judge vendor performance and maintain compliance. Most obvious, this
entails the monitoring of the contractors over the terms of the contracts. Vendors who are
deemed to not be meeting their contractual obligations should be identified through the
monitoring process and should be sanctioned accordingly (e.g., have their contracts pulled
or not renewed) regardless of the tendering method (i.e., competitive or noncompetitive).
But there is also a market component that, in some ways, may enhance the internal control.
We develop two hypotheses regarding market accountability. First, the competition hypoth-
esis posits that competition, independent of performance, should be associated with vendor
turnover because, at least on occasion, good vendors should lose contracts to high-quality
competitors. In addition, we expect that monitoring matters more for competitive vendors
because agencies should be more willing, and possibly find it easier, to replace marginally
performing vendors when the contracting environment is competitive in nature. Problems
that might not warrant action against noncompetitive contractors might be enough to lead
to action being taken against competitive vendors. This we name the differential impact
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hypothesis. Specifically, contractors who earned their contracts through competitive processes
should be more likely to suffer performance-related sanctions (i.e., losing contracts) than
their noncompetitive counterparts.
With regard to the types of performance criteria, Romzek and Dubnick (1994) provide
four dimensions that should be considered as determinants of future contracting decisions:
hierarchical, legal, political, and professional accountabilities. In social service contracting
schemes, commonly adopted accountability measures are legal in nature (Dicke & Ott, 1999)
and involve broad sets of external control mechanisms on process including laws, mandates,
program standards, regulations, and other contractual terms and conditions (Bardach &
Lesser, 1996; Blasi, 2002; Dicke, 2002; Dicke & Ott, 1999; Romzek & Johnston, 2005).
Contract oversight in DCF is often focused on these legal and contractual aspects because
they are relatively easy to measure and enforceable in the form of written contract clauses
(Lamothe, 2004). Our effort to tie provider accountability to future contracting decisions,
therefore, focuses on vendor compliance with legal and contractual terms and conditions.
More specifically, we examine the following aspects as defined in the SMORES: invoicing,
service tasks including legal and program mandates, personnel and staffing, performance
specifications, incident-reporting procedures, and administrative monitoring related to
federal and state rules and regulations.
Accountability Through Competition 
and Monitoring in Florida
To examine the effects of both managerial control through the oversight of provider
performance and competition on contracting, we focus our analysis on three variables. The
first, used to measure contractor performance, is the number of major violations reported
for the contractor in the SMORES database. Contract noncompliance is rated as “major”
if failures could result in harm to clients or interruption of service or if there is evidence of
fraud or severe fiscal instability in the provider (Florida DCF, 2003b).16 The managerial
control hypothesis posits that, regardless of the nature of the initial tendering, the number
of major violations will have a negative impact on the likelihood of contract continuation
as these problems can be detrimental to achieving contract effectiveness.
The second focus variable is the proportion of the vendor’s contracts that were competi-
tively procured. Ceteris paribus, the competition hypothesis postulates that contractors
operating in more competitive environments (i.e., services involving competitive procure-
ment) should be less likely to maintain contracts because replacement vendors should be
easier to come by.17 The third, and final, variable of interest is an interaction term produced
by multiplying the performance and competition variables together. This measure allows us
to test if the impact of poor performance (as measured by the number of major violations)
is conditioned by the contracting environment (i.e., competitive or noncompetitive). If this
differential impact hypothesis holds, we should see evidence that the influence of major
violations is greater on vendors with larger percentages of competitively procured contracts.
Hence, we expect the estimate on this variable to be negative and significant.
We link SMORES data from FY 2003-2004 to contract status in FY 2004-2005 to test
the above hypotheses. Ideally, we would like to use individual contracts as the unit of analysis.
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Unfortunately, the monitoring reports contained in SMORES are for vendors, many of whom
hold multiple contracts within a district.18 This, combined with the fact that many adverse
findings are associated with vendor shortcomings and are not contract specific (e.g., fiscal
instability), indicates that individual vendors in districts is an appropriate unit of analysis.19
We test our hypotheses using two dependent variables: whether the vendor maintained
any contracts in the district in 2004-2005 and the number of contracts held in 2004-2005
relative to the number held in 2003-2004.20
We also control for other potential influences on the likelihood of retaining contracts.
Because our first dependent variable measures if any contracts are maintained, we control
for the total number of contracts held in FY 2003-2004. Obviously, vendors with many
contracts should be less likely to lose all than vendors with only one. The total dollar value
of contracts held by vendors is also included. This measure taps into a similar dynamic as
the number of contracts—large, influential vendors might be more difficult to replace.
Although the connection between these two variables and our second dependent variable,
proportion of contracts retained, may not be as obvious, reasons for the controls are similar.
That is, ceteris paribus, vendors holding larger number of contracts will be likely to retain
higher proportions of their contracts because public managers would usually prefer the
status quo, which minimizes administrative and monitoring-related transaction costs, over
new contracts with new vendors that involve new learning curves (Milward & Provan,
2000). Similarly, vendors that attract large amounts of contracting dollars should tend to
retain higher proportions of their contracts because they are more influential players in the
contracting world and thus harder to replace. On the other hand, there is the possibility that
vendors with more contracts will lose some simply because of an overall movement favor-
ing contract consolidation. Looking back to Table 1, we see there is a general trend toward
fewer contracts statewide over the time frame of our study (e.g., total contracts fell from
1,102 in 2003-2004 to 859 in 2004-2005), whereas spending increased. As there was not a
drop in contracting effort, as reviewed previously, contract consolidation appears to have
occurred. It is possible that vendors do not lose contracts because of poor performance, but
rather the contracts they held are merged, resulting in fewer numbers of contracts, but not
lower contract responsibility. These possibilities need to be controlled for.
As mentioned above, CBC in family safety is a statewide effort to coordinate service
delivery that has led to much contract consolidation. Such consolidation is systematic and
needs to be accounted for in our analysis because vendors could lose contracts for no other
reason than new or expanded CBC activity occurred in their district. The potential impacts
of contract consolidation on the likelihood of losing or retaining contracts in the next cycle
is already partially captured in the control variable described above, the total number of
contracts held. However, this CBC factor should be separately accounted for because there
is a clear and direct link between the creation of new CBC lead agencies and the consider-
able reduction in the number of family safety contracts whose programs and services are
overlapped with the CBC contracts. Finally, we take into account market condition. As
other studies have suggested (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Greene, 1996), larger, wealthier
areas might provide a greater pool of prospective vendors, leading to more competition and
a better contracting environment. We account for this possibility by controlling for district
population density and per capita personal income.
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In Table 4, which shows the results for the model predicting vendor exit from the market,
we find some support for our hypotheses and some interesting contradictions. The results
indicate that provider performance, as measured by the number of major violations, is
negatively associated with contract continuance for vendors who obtained their contracts
noncompetitively (b = –0.100, p = .054). Holding all other variables constant, a one standard
deviation increase from the mean for this variable (i.e., moving from 1.86 to 6.56 “majors”)
decreases the probability of holding contracts by 1.7 percentage points. Although a change
in probability of 1.7 percentage points might seem less than consequential to some, it is
significant to point out that the baseline probability of retaining contracts (i.e., the proba-
bility when all variables are held at their means or modes as appropriate) is 88.2%. Hence,
the data are rather skewed. Because logit assumes maximum effects at a 50% probability
of occurrence, predicted impacts are somewhat attenuated by the model at high baseline
probabilities. Also, it is important to remember that a zero on the dependent variable indicates
a loss of all contracts, which is a rather strenuous sanction. We interpret this variable to
indicate that managers, through the monitoring process, are gathering the data they need to
identify and sanction poorly performing vendors.
We also see that vendors with higher proportions of competitively procured contracts,
but no major violations, are less likely to maintain their contracts (b = –1.804, p = .015). In
this case, a one standard deviation increase from the mean leads to a 2.8 percentage point
Table 4
Logit Analysis for Likelihood of Vendors Losing Any Contracts
Variable b SE p value Impact
Performance and competition measures
# of major findings –0.100 0.052 .054 –.017
Proportion of contracts competitively procured –1.804 0.742 .015 –.028
Major × proportion competitively procured 0.513 0.385 .182
Controls
# of contracts in 2003-2004 0.413 0.225 .067 .051
Total value of contracts 0.084 0.085 .324
New or expanded community-based care in 2004-2005 –0.472 0.528 .371
District per capita personal income 0.074 0.049 .132
District population density 0.002 0.001 .024 .063
Constant –1.994 1.424 .162
n 205
χ2 41.436a
p .000
Source: Statewide Monitoring Reporting System was the source for # of major findings; Florida Accounting
and Information Resource was the source for proportion of contracts competitively procured, # of contracts in
2003-2004, total value of contracts, and new or expanded community-based care in 2004-2005; University of
Florida (2005) was the source for the district per capita personal income and density measures.
Note: Impact is calculated for variables that reached at least marginal significance (i.e., p < .10, two-tailed) by
increasing the value of these variables from their means to one standard deviation above their means while holding
all other variables at their means or modes, as appropriate (the values for the multiplicative term were determined
by the values of the base terms). The baseline probability of holding contracts (i.e., the probability when all
variables are held at their means or modes, as appropriate) is .882.
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decrease in the probability the vendor has contracts in 2004-2005. This can be seen as sup-
port for the competition hypothesis in that market competition leads to vendor turnover
even when performance does not appear to be an issue. This can be interpreted to indicate
that good vendors are being replaced by, what are hoped to be, better ones.
Finally, we do not find support for the differential impact hypothesis. The interaction
term, representing the product of the performance and competition variables, is not statis-
tically distinguishable from zero (b = 0.513, p = .182), indicating the impact of major
findings does not vary by mode of vendor selection (i.e., competitive or not). That is, poorly
performing competitive contractors are no more, or less, likely to lose contracts in the
next round.
The results from our model with the dependent variable accounting for the relative
number of contracts held across the two time periods generally support the above findings.
We see in Table 5 that, again, the “number of major findings” and “proportion of contracts
competitively procured” parameter estimates are negative and statistically significant
(although the p value for the findings variable increases). Vendors who hold noncompeti-
tive contracts see their ratio of contracts held diminish as their number of adverse findings
increases. Likewise, vendors holding higher proportions of competitively procured contracts,
but no major violations, are associated with lower ratios. We also see that, once again, the
interaction term is insignificant, indicating the effect of major violations is the same regard-
less of whether contracts are competitive or not. The only notable difference across the
models is that holding more contracts in 2003-2004 is positively associated with vendor
retention in the first model and negatively associated with the ratio of contracts held in the
second. So although holding more contracts makes it less likely that a vendor exits the market,
it appears to make it more likely the vendor will hold fewer overall contracts in the second
period (possibly because of consolidation).
Table 5
Regression Analysis of Why Vendors Lose or Gain Contracts
Variable b SE p value
Performance and competition measures
# of major findings –0.013 0.007 .073
Proportion of contracts competitively procured –0.413 0.134 .002
Major × proportion competitively procured 0.039 0.056 .487
Controls
# of contracts in 2003-2004 –0.045 0.022 .048
Total value of contracts 0.003 0.006 .562
New or expanded community-based care in 2004-2005 –0.085 0.087 .327
District per capita personal income 0.016 0.007 .016
District population density 0.000 0.000 .034
Constant 0.300 0.202 .140
n 205
F 6.256
p .000
Adjusted R2 .171
Note: p values are based on two-tailed tests. See notes to Table 4 for data information.
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Conclusion
When we set out to search for competition in human service contracting, our initial expec-
tation, based on the majority of findings in the extant literature, was that noncompetition
would be the usual modus operandi. In our undertaking, however, we substantially broadened
the concept of competition into three aspects: procurement, consolidation, and account-
ability. We also stretched our analysis over a 5-year span to capture trends and changes. The
expansion of the conceptual and analytic scopes and the resultant findings suggest that
competition in human service markets and its policy implications should be discussed
within multifaceted contexts and understandings rather than in a dichotomous framework
of competition versus noncompetition. Such multiplicity is observed in all three aspects of
the social service contracting practices examined.
For instance, although our findings suggest that noncompetitive outsourcing is still a
common practice in purchasing human services in Florida and mostly consistent with what
previous studies have found in other states (e.g., Michigan—DeHoog, 1984; New York—
Van Slyke, 2003), competitiveness has been on the rise in recent years. An increase in
spending through competitively procured services was particularly striking (i.e., competi-
tively procured contracts increased as a proportion of all contract spending from 15.2% in
2000-2001 to 39.8% in 2004-2005). A closer look at the data, however, suggests that the
high level of competitive spending was mainly driven by the large CBC contracts in the
family safety program, whose true competitiveness is still in need of future investigation
because of their network structures and subcontracting practices.
The uniqueness of the CBC contracts introduces a layer of complexity as we strive to
understand whether and why social service markets consolidate and what impacts and policy
implications such consolidation can impose on marketized service delivery systems. For
example, the fact that fewer vendors have direct contracts with the state, and that those that
do tend to have larger and longer-term contracts than has traditionally been the case, signi-
fies a potential pathway to monopolistic markets and compromised efficiency in the long
run. On the other hand, the CBC structure allows public managers to change management
(i.e., replace lead agencies) without causing severe service disruptions because the under-
lying network of service providers remains unchanged and thus leaves incumbent lead
agencies with less leverage. This deviation from typical market structures may serve as a
counterforce to the potential for monopoly outcomes.
It is interesting that although family safety contracting was transformed over the term of
our study, the other large program, mental health and substance abuse services, saw very
little change. Not only was there a lack of consolidation in this area, but also the use of
competitive contracts did not grow nearly as much as was seen in family safety. It would
appear that contractors’ political clout staved off moves toward restructuring the service
delivery market in this area. However, there have been some mental health and substance
abuse pilot managed care programs recently, which could lead to future changes that mirror
those observed in family safety (personal communication, DCF administrator, September 25,
2007). Should this occur, the CBC experience described above will take on greater relevance
to a larger pool of managers as they seek to implement these transformations.
Last, we found competition to have a mixed impact regarding provider accountability.
Poor performers, who secured their contracts in a noncompetitive manner and had serious
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contract violations, are less likely to maintain their contracts in the next round, as one would
hope and expect. This is an interesting discovery in that the prevalence of noncompetition
does not appear to routinely result in the absence of accountability—internal managerial
controls seem to work. We also found evidence that higher proportions of competitively pro-
cured contracts are associated with vendor turnover, even when performance is not prob-
lematic. This is as one would expect in truly competitive markets. However, in contrast to
our expectations, there was no support for the differential impact hypothesis. That is,
accountability was not more stringent for contractors with greater proportions of competi-
tively procured contracts. Vendors with competitively procured contracts were no more
likely to be replaced or lose contracts in terms of the relative numbers held across the years
than their noncompetitive counterparts as their number of contract violations increased.
All of these findings suggest that we need to look beyond the conventional competition–
noncompetition framework to better understand the complexity involving how public man-
agers manage social service contracts and how they may attempt to strike a balance along
the spectrum of competitive–noncompetitive means of contract management available to them
to achieve effectiveness. By using a continuous rather than dichotomous view of contract
management, our study contributes to expanding what Milward and Provan (2000) find in
their breakthrough study of human service delivery networks. They challenge the basic
premises of market theory and its applicability to human service delivery systems by sug-
gesting that competition can be a disruptor rather than producer of program effectiveness.
We further argue and demonstrate that government utilizes a blend of competitive and
noncompetitive management tools (as indicated by our findings regarding the agency’s
increasing use of competitive procurement, its internal managerial control across the com-
petitively and noncompetitively procured contracts spectrum, and its increasing use of
large-scale, long-term, consolidated CBC contracts) to achieve efficiency and program
effectiveness. It is interesting that the most recent evaluation report on the Florida CBCs
(Vargo et al., 2006) indicates that these competitively procured, but arguably noncompeti-
tive, systems have been more successful at reaching their goals of effective child welfare
service delivery than was the pre-CBC contracting scheme. Specifically what factors and
network circumstances have contributed to this reported success is left to future research.
The findings in this article, however, can be seen as a call for future attention to what lies
beyond the competition prescription, as public managers may, on average, adopt pragmatic
managerial approaches as opposed to focusing on ideological and political principles in
their service delivery endeavors (Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 109; Warner & Hefetz, 2004).
Notes
1. We use social services, health and human services, and human services interchangeably throughout the
article. Although these terms may denote slightly different sets of services, their institutional boundaries in
governmental service delivery systems are often vague, so that attempting to differentiate one from another
would be impractical. Moreover, because our data set relies on one particular institutional setting (i.e., Florida
Department of Children and Families [DCF]) and the comprehensive sets of health, human, or social services
that it provides, using these terms interchangeably suits our analytical purposes.
2. Interested readers can contact the authors for a list of the specific services examined.
3. Contract noncompliance is rated as “major” if failures could result in harm to clients, if failures could
result in interruption of service, or if there is evidence of fraud or severe fiscal instability in the provider;
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“minor” if mistakes are unintentional, nonsystematic, and easily correctable such as technical errors in report-
ing or accounting; and “moderate” if the findings are more serious than minor but do not reach the level of a
major concern (see Florida DCF, 2003b).
4. The Statewide Monitoring Reporting System (SMORES) reporting system was discontinued in FY
2004-2005. At this time, a new secretary was appointed to lead the department, which prompted a reorganiza-
tion that affected the central contracting office. The new leadership chose not to continue the program.
5. Of the contracts in our analysis, 68.1% ran for 1 year or less, and 90.3% had a duration of less than 2
years. The mean length of contract over the entire time frame was 1.16 years, with a standard deviation of 0.70
(n = 6,002).
6. In terms of numbers, 17.6% of the contracts in the original database were dropped from the analysis
because they were valued at less than $25,000. Not surprising, because these are small contracts, those that were
dropped accounted for only a small proportion of overall spending on social service contracts—less than 1% in
any given year.
7. There were no notable changes over time regarding the proportion of contracts held between the sectors:
For-profits consistently accounted for the smallest percentage, holding between 8.3% and 10.5% of contracts
each year; other governments held the middle ground, ranging between 10.2% and 14.3%; and nonprofits
accounted for between 76.3% and 79.6%, depending on the year. Regarding the average monetary size of con-
tracts, once an extreme outlier was dropped, for-profits held the smallest average contracts in each year of the
study. Contracts with other government entities accounted for the largest average contracts in 2000-2001, but
nonprofits held the largest average contracts in each subsequent year.
8. According to the operating procedure manual of Florida DCF (2003a), an invitation to bid is defined as
a “written solicitation for competitive sealed bids used when the department can specifically define the scope
of work or when the department can establish precise specifications defining the actual commodity” (p. 24) and
the lowest qualified bid must be accepted.
9. For example, the Florida Council for Community Mental Health is a well-known statewide association
of 70 community-based mental health and substance abuse nonprofit organizations and has been highly influ-
ential in shaping behavioral health care policies in Florida. On a related note, a Florida Senate staff member has
pointed out that although the legislature is aware of potential problems associated with the many exempted
services, there is no current effort to curtail them, as this is a volatile issue that members generally do not want
to take on.
10. Overall, competitive solicitation (i.e., a competitive method was attempted, regardless of outcome)
increased by 7.7 percentage points.
11. There appears to be a reporting error in the economic self-sufficiency economic data. In FY 2000-2001,
an information and referral services contract is listed as worth $26.4 million. In subsequent years the contract
ranges between $2 million and $2.5 million. Consultation with a DCF administrator led us to believe the dis-
crepancy is simply the result of a “typo,” but as we could not definitively identify the source of the problem,
we do not discuss the financing for this program area in the text.
12. According to a report from the Florida Legislature, Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability (2006b), lead agencies are “private, community-based agencies or county governments respon-
sible for planning, administering, and delivering client services; ensuring that services are delivered in accor-
dance with state and federal laws; and coordinating with other local public or private agencies that offer services
for clients” (p. 1).
13. An exception is the YMCA in Sarasota County, an early pilot provider that became a fully operational
lead agency in 1997 (Paulson et al., 2002).
14. Some annual contracts may have extended contract periods (e.g., 18 months instead of 12 months), but
we consider them as annual rather than multiyear contracts.
15. It is important to point out that we are talking only about single contract terms. It is also possible, and
maybe likely, that incumbent vendors will win renewal of their contracts, which could exacerbate the situation.
Unfortunately, the structure of our data does not allow us to explore this possibility.
16. SMORES also reports lesser violations that are termed “moderate” or “minor” (see Note 3). These are
not used in the analysis because contract termination is likely too strong an expected sanction for such viola-
tions. As a check, we ran the model with these measures of lesser violations included, and the results were
mostly identical to those reported in this article—neither variable achieved statistical significance, and the
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statistical and substantive significance of the other variables were essentially unchanged. Interested readers may
obtain these results from the authors.
17. A better measure of the competitiveness of the environment would be the number of bidders for each
contract, but unfortunately such information is not available. At the request of a reviewer, we also substituted
the proportion of contracting dollars procured through competitive processes for the proportion of contracts
measure. The results are essentially identical and are available from the authors on request.
18. Monitoring is a labor- and resource-intensive activity. As such, DCF performs a limited number of such
assessments each year based most directly on contract risk level (i.e., vendors with contracts deemed “high risk”
are most likely to be monitored). In FY 2004-2005, SMORES contains 205 monitoring reports, which accounts
for all on-site monitoring over that time frame. There are an additional 367 contract-holding vendors that did
not have on-site visits in their districts. The descriptive statistics for the monitored and nonmonitored vendors
can be obtained, for purposes of comparison, by contacting the authors.
19. We are currently working to see if we can disaggregate the data down to the contract level to provide a
more stringent test. This is proving an arduous task, hence our reliance on vendor-level measures in these analyses.
20. Generally, one would expect this measure to range from 0 to 1 because it would most often be the case
that a vendor maintained its contracts or lost some. However, in some instances, vendors may gain additional
contracts. Although this was rare, it did occur—two vendors score 1.5 and eight score 2.0 on this variable, indi-
cating that they increased the total number of contracts held between 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 by 50% and
100%, respectively. Those that score 1.5 increased their holdings from two contracts to three and all those scoring
2.0 increased from one to two.
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